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Abstract
Sequential allocation is a simple and widely studied mechanism to allocate indivisible
items in turns to agents according to a pre-specified picking sequence of agents. At each
turn, the current agent in the picking sequence picks its most preferred item among all items
having not been allocated yet. This problem is well-known to be not strategyproof, i.e., an
agent may get more utility by reporting an untruthful preference ranking of items. It arises
the problem: how to find the best response of an agent? It is known that this problem is
polynomially solvable for only two agents and NP-complete for arbitrary number of agents.
The computational complexity of this problem with three agents was left as an open problem.
In this paper, we give a novel algorithm that solves the problem in polynomial time for each
fixed number of agents. We also show that an agent can always get at least half of its optimal
utility by simply using its truthful preference as the response.
1 Introduction
Sequential allocation is a simple and widely studied mechanism to allocate indivisible items to
agents [7, 8, 3]. In a sequential allocation mechanism, there are several indivisible items to
be allocated to some agents, each agent has a strict preference ranking over all the items, and
there is a sequence of the agents, called the policy, to specify the turns of the agents to get the
items. The items are allocated to the agents according to the policy: at each turn, the current
agent on the policy picks the most preferred item in its preference ranking that has not yet been
allocated. We give an example.
Example 1 There are five items {a, b, c, d, e}, three agents {1, 2, 3} with preference rankings
Agent 1 : a  b  c  d  e
Agent 2 : c  b  e  d  a
Agent 3 : e  b  d  c  a
and a policy
pi : 13221.
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In this example, Agent 1 will take a at the first turn, Agent 3 will take e at the second turn,
Agent 2 will take two items c and b at the third and fourth turns, and Agent 1 will take d at
the last turn.
In sequential allocation, given a fixed policy, the outcome will only depend on the ordinal
preference rankings of agents over items. It is folklore that sequential allocation is not strate-
gyproof, which means that an agent may get more utility by reporting an untruthful preference
ranking. For example, in the above instance, if Agent 1 misreports its preference ranking as
b  a  c  d  e, then it will get items {b, a}, while originally it will get items {a, d}. Agent 1
may get more utility by taking {b, a} since b  d. This motivates many aspects of study on this
mechanism.
There are several models based on the sequential allocation mechanism. We have differ-
ent objectives to maximize the overall social welfare [7] or the utility of a certain agent [8],
and different requirements on the pattern of the picking sequences and the number of agents.
One of the earliest models studied in [13] has two agents and the policy is strictly alternating
(e.g., 121212 . . .). A balanced alternation pattern of the policy (e.g., 12212112 . . .) was studied
in [9]. One interesting application of sequential allocation was found in course allocation to
students and several axiomatic properties and manipulability on this application have been re-
vealed. Budish and Cantillion [10] investigated a randomized version of the sequential allocation
mechanism to allocate courses to students, and Pareto optimal solutions for a model of course
allocation were studied in [11]. The Boston mechanism is another sequential allocation mecha-
nism with applications in school choice for students [1, 14]. A general and systematic study of
the sequential allocation was done by Bouveret and Lang [7] and by Kalinowski et al. [12] from
a game-theoretic view. Since the work of Kohler and Chandrasekaran [13], a series of followup
works on strategic aspects of sequential allocation have been made [5, 6, 15, 16, 4].
In this paper, we consider manipulations in sequential allocation. In this model, the policy
is given, and among all agents, one is the manipulator and all others are non-manipulators. The
manipulator needs to report a list of items as its preference ranking to achieve a certain objective.
There are two commonly used assumptions. Firstly, the manipulator has complete information
about the reported preferences of non-manipulators. This is a worst case assumption often made
in computer science and economics. Secondly, the manipulator has additive cardinal utilities for
the items, although agents report strict and ordinal preferences. This assumption is standard
in this research area.
We can define several problems with different objectives of the problem. The Best Re-
sponse problem is to find a best response of the manipulator (i.e., a preference ranking which
allows it to obtain the maximum utility). Better Than Truth Response is to ask whether
the manipulator can get more utility than the allocation under its truthful report. Allocation
Response is to ask whether the manipulator can get a specified bundle of items. Among all
these problems, Best Response seems to be the hardest one and a solution to it can imply
solutions to other problems, since other problems can be easily reduced to Best Response.
See [2] for a recent survey on the results for these problems.
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For Best Response, Bouveret and Lang [7] first showed that the problem with only two
agents (one manipulator and one non-manipulator) can be solved in polynomial time. Then
Aziz et al. [3] proved that it is NP-hard to compute the best response of the manipulator if
the number of agents is part of the input by correcting a wrong claim in a previous paper. It
becomes an open problem whether Best Response is polynomially solvable for three or another
constant number of agents [3]. This open problem is interesting because it is already known
that the problem is polynomially solvable with the utility functions of the manipulator being
some specified functions, such as lexi-cographic utilities and binary utilities [7, 3]. In this paper,
we fully answer this question by giving a dynamic programming algorithm for Best Response
that runs in polynomial time for any fixed number of agents and any additive utility functions.
In addition, we show that the manipulator can always get at least half of the optimal utility if
it simply uses the truthful preference ranking, where the approximation ratio is tight as far as
using the truthful preference ranking.
2 Preliminaries
In the sequential allocation problem, m items are going to be allocated to n agents according
to a policy pi, which is a sequence of agents specifying the turns of the agents to get items. The
length |pi| of the policy is m since there are m items to be allocated. The set of items is denoted
by O = {g1, g2, . . . , gm} and the set of agents is denoted by N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, where Agent 1 is
the manipulator and all other agents are non-manipulators. Each agent i ∈ N has a complete
preference ranking i: gi1 , gi2 , . . . , gim over all items in O. We will write gp i gq to denote
that item gp is ranked ahead of gq in Agent i’s preference ranking. The manipulator (Agent 1)
has an additive utility function on the items u : O → <+. For two items gx, gy ∈ O, it holds
u(gx) > u(gy) if and only if gx 1 gy. We use ki (i ∈ N) to denote the frequency of Agent i
appearing in the policy pi, and use m′ to denote the frequency of non-manipulators appearing
in pi. Then it holds that
m =
n∑
i=1
ki, and m
′ = m− k1.
For Best Response, the manipulator wants to find a picking strategy to achieve its max-
imum utility, i.e., a permutation of all the items, according to which to pick up items the
manipulator can get the maximum utility. When we say a solution to Best Response, it is
regarded as the optimal picking strategy or the bundle of items for the manipulator determined
by the optimal picking strategy. We use I = (O,N, pi, {i}ni=1) to denote our input instance,
where we omit the utility function of the manipulator to simplify the description since for most
cases we only use the preference ranking 1.
Once a picking strategy is given, we will get a fixed sequence of allocations of all items to
agents, called allocation sequence. We will say the above picking strategy and allocation sequence
are associated with each other. If there is no picking strategy associated with an allocation
sequence, then the allocation sequence is called infeasible; otherwise, it is called feasible. For a
feasible allocation sequence, it is easy to construct one picking strategy associated with it.
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A partial allocation sequence is a sub sequence of an allocation sequence beginning from
the first allocation. We will use ξ to denote an allocation sequence and use ξ(i) to denote the
partial allocation sequence of the first i allocations of ξ. For each feasible partial allocation
sequence of length l, there is a partial policy of length l and a partial picking strategy associated
with it. After executing a partial allocation sequence according to a partial policy, we will get
a remaining problem which is to allocate the remaining items to the agents according to the
remaining policy.
Given a (partial) allocation sequence, we say an item g has been considered by Agent i before
the xth position of the (partial) policy if during the first x allocations in the sequence the last
item allocated to Agent i is ranked lower than item g in Agent i’s preference ranking. Note that
an item may not be allocated to an agent even if the item has been considered by the agent.
A segment in a policy is a maximal continuous subsequence containing at most one position
of a non-manipulator and only the last position of the subsequence can be the non-manipulator.
A policy having m′ positions of non-manipulators can be partitioned into m′ + 1 segments by
cutting after each non-manipulator position, where the last segment is called a trivial segment.
A trivial segment only contains copies of the manipulator and it may be empty (when the last
position of the policy is a non-manipulator). A nontrivial segment may contain only one non-
manipulator. We will use pis(x) to denote the partial policy of the first x segments of pi. The
core of a (partial) policy is the sequence of agents obtained by deleting all occurrences of the
manipulator from the (partial) policy. See Figure 1 for an illustration of the segments and cores.
Policy 131123111：
The core: 323
13 112 3 111
(2)s Trivial segment
Figure 1: The segments and core
The position vector of the manipulator in a (partial) policy pi is a sequence of increasing
positive integers, (z1, z2, . . . , zk1) to denote the positions of the manipulator in the policy pi, i.e.,
the manipulator appears on the z1th, z2th, . . ., and zk1th positions in the (partial) policy pi. A
policy pi dominates another policy pi′ if they have the same length and the same core and it holds
that zi ≤ z′i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k1}, for manipulator position vectors in pi and pi′ being (z1, z2, . . . , zk1)
and (z′1, z′2, . . . , z′k1), respectively. This is to say that pi
′ can be obtained from pi by iteratively
moving a manipulator in it to the next position. For two instances I = (O,N, pi, {i}ni=1) and
I ′ = (O,N, pi′, {i}ni=1) with only different policies, if pi dominates pi′, then we say instance I
dominates instance I ′.
Our algorithm for Best Response uses two major ideas. The first idea is to reduce instances
to constrained instances, called “crucial instances”. Crucial instances can be solved quickly
directly. However, it is not easy to find the corresponding crucial instances and we still need to
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search among a large number of candidates. So we also use the second idea, which is a divide-
and-conquer technique, to reduce the number of candidates. The divide-and-conquer method
will split the allocation problem into two subproblems: the first one is to allocate a fixed set
of items and the second one is to allocate the remaining set of items. To guarantee that we
can combine optimal solutions to the two parts to construct an optimal solution for the whole
problem, we need some “invariance properties”. Based on “invariance properties”, we are able
to design a dynamic programming algorithm to save running time. We first introduce the two
ideas in the following two sections.
3 Crucial Instances
In Best Response, we may have the same optimal picking strategy for two instances with
only different policies. These instances have some common properties. We will classify some
instances (and their policies) that have the same optimal picking strategy and solution into a
class. In each class, there is a special instance, called “crucial instance”, which can be solved
directly. So we will try to solve an instance by solving the corresponding crucial instance in the
same class. This is the rough idea of our algorithm.
We give an example to illustrate that two instances with only different policies have the same
optimal solution. In Example 1, the manipulator gets the best bundle {a, b} by using picking
strategy bacde. We use I ′ to denote the instance after replacing the policy pi : 13221 with policy
pi′ : 32121. In I ′, the manipulator can get the same best bundle {a, b} by using the same picking
strategy. Compared with pi, the manipulator has a lower priority to pick items in pi′. However,
the manipulator still can get the best solution. Note that, at the first position of the policy pi,
the manipulator picks an item that will not be considered by any non-manipulator before the
3rd allocation. So we can delay the allocation of b to Agent 1 from position 1 to position 3
without changing the optimality. Given an instance, we want to know how much we can delay
the positions of the manipulator without losing the optimality and the “worst” policy will be
“crucial”.
Definition 1 (Crucial Instance) For an instance I = (O,N, pi, {i}ni=1), if for any policy
pi′ 6= pi dominated by pi, the optimal solution to the dominated instance I ′ = (O,N, pi′, {i}ni=1) is
worse than that to I, then we say I is a crucial instance. Let I ′ = (O,N, pi′, {i}ni=1) be a crucial
instance, for any instance I = (O,N, pi, {i}ni=1) dominating I ′, we say I ′ is a corresponding
crucial instance to I.
A corresponding crucial instance of an instance may be itself when it is already a crucial
instance. To solve an instance, we can turn to solve a corresponding crucial instance by the
following lemmas.
Lemma 1 Given two instances I = (O,N, pi, {i}ni=1) and I ′ = (O,N, pi′, {i}ni=1), where I
dominates I ′. By using the same picking strategy, the manipulator in instance I will get a
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bundle with total utility not less than that in I ′. Furthermore, for any picking strategy S′, there
is a picking strategy S such that by using S in I the manipulator can get the same bundle as
that by using S′ in I ′.
Proof. The first claim is easy to observe. We focus on the second claim.
We define the picking strategy S to I as follows: order the items according to the ordering
of allocations to the manipulator in I ′ by using S′, i.e., an item is ranked on the ith position in
S if it is the ith item allocated to the manipulator in I ′, and all other items not allocated to the
manipulator in I ′ are listed behind with any order. Let (z1, z2, . . . , zk1) and (z′1, z′2, . . . , z′k1) be
the position vectors of the manipulator of pi and pi′. Since pi dominates pi′, we know that zi ≤ z′i
for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k1}. If an item can be allocated to the manipulator at position z′i in pi′,
then it can also be allocated to the manipulator at position zi ≤ z′i in pi, since only a subset of
items have been allocated before position zi in pi (compared to the situation at position z
′
i in
pi′). So at each position, the manipulator can always get the current item on its picking strategy
S. By using S, the manipulator in I gets the same bundle as that by using S′ in I ′.
Lemma 2 Let I = (O,N, pi, {i}ni=1) be an instance and S be a picking strategy for the ma-
nipulator. Assume that by taking S the manipulator picks an item at the ith position of pi and
this item is not considered by any non-manipulator before the jth allocation, where j > i + 1.
Let pi′ be the new policy obtained from pi by moving the manipulator from the ith position to the
(j − 1)th position. By using picking strategy S in I ′ = (O,N, pi′, {i}ni=1) the manipulator can
get the same bundle as that by using S in I.
Proof.
We consider the allocation sequence under the picking strategy S in I: g1 7→1 l1, g2 7→2
l2, . . . , gm 7→m lm, where l1, l2, . . . , lm ∈ N and it is possible lj = lk for j 6= k. In the allocation
sequence, item gi is allocated to the manipulator at position i, and before allocating the jth good
gj , the item gi has never been considered by any non-manipulator. Therefore, moving the ith
position to the jth position in pi will not affect the allocations on the (i+1)th to (j−1)th positions.
Furthermore, after allocating these items, we still can allocate item gi to the manipulator on
the jth position since it is still available. All other allocations will keep unchanged. Thus,
the following is still a feasible allocation sequence for I ′: g1 7→1 l1, . . . , gi−1 7→i−1 li−1, gi+1 7→i
li+1, . . . , gi 7→j−1 li, gj 7→j lj , . . . , gm 7→m im, in which the manipulator will get the same bundle
as that in I.
Corollary 1 Let I = (O,N, pi, {i}ni=1) be an instance and I ′ = (O,N, pi′, {i}ni=1) be a corre-
sponding crucial instance. An optimal picking strategy for I ′ is also an optimal picking strategy
for I.
Next, we show how to solve crucial instances.
Lemma 3 Crucial instances of Best Response can be solved in linear time.
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To prove Lemma 3, we use an algorithm to solve crucial instances optimally. The algorithm
is a greedy algorithm, called GreedyAlg. We introduce the algorithm separately below because
it will also be used in several places later.
Algorithm GreedyAlg The algorithm GreedyAlg takes a (sub) instance of Best Re-
sponse as the input, and outputs an allocation sequence with the corresponding picking strategy
for the manipulator. However, the output allocation sequence may not be optimal for non-crucial
instances.
The main idea of the algorithm is as follows. We allocate items to agents according to the
policy. Assume that we have allocated the first i − 1 items to agents in the input instance
I = (O,N, pi, {i}ni=1). If the ith position in the policy pi is a non-manipulator, we let the
non-manipulator pick its most preferred item that has not yet been allocated. Next, we consider
the situation that the ith position in the policy pi is the manipulator. The algorithm decides
the item that should be assigned to the manipulator at the ith turn by the following method.
We let I ′ = (O′, N, pi′, {′i}ni=1) be the remaining instance after allocating the first i−1 items
in I. Then the first position in pi′ is the manipulator. Let pi−1 be the core of pi′.If pi−1 is empty,
we assign the best remaining item o in the truthful preference ranking of the manipulator to the
manipulator at the ith position of pi and let o be the ith object in the picking strategy of the
manipulator. If pi−1 is not empty, we let of be the favourite item in O′ of the first agent in pi−1.
GreedyAlg will assign item of to the manipulator at the ith position of pi and let of be the ith
object in the picking strategy of the manipulator.
According to the above method, the algorithm decides the items to be assigned to the
manipulator from the first occurrence of 1 to the last occurrence of 1 in pi and then we can
get a full allocation sequence and a picking strategy for the manipulator. This is the algorithm
GreedyAlg.
It is easy to see that GreedyAlg can be implemented in linear time and the picking strategy
returned by GreedyAlg for each instance is unique.
The allocation sequence returned by GreedyAlg on a (sub) instance is called greedy. Given
an allocation sequence, we can easily check whether it is greedy or not. The concept of greedy
allocation sequence is also important and will be used later.
The correctness of Lemma 3 directly follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 4 The greedy strategy for a crucial instance is the optimal solution to it.
In fact, a crucial instance has only one optimal allocation sequence, which is the greedy one
obtained by GreedyAlg. Note that if in a solution, the manipulator at the ith position of pi
does not pick item of , then we could move the ith position of 1 to the behind of the first non-
manipulator in pi to get a dominated instance I ′, where I ′ has the same optimal solution as I ′,
which contradicts the fact that I is a crucial instance.
Although crucial instances can be solved quickly, it is still hard to find a corresponding
crucial instance for an arbitrary instance. We need to reveal more properties for dominated
instances.
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Lemma 1 implies that the optimal solution to an instance is not worse than the optimal
solution to any dominated instance. Clearly, the opposite direction of Lemma 1 may not hold.
We prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Let I be an instance and P be the set of instances dominated by I. For each I ′ ∈ P,
we use G(I ′) to denote the greedy allocation sequence of I ′. Assume that the greedy allocation
sequence G(I0) (I0 ∈ P) gets the best solution among all G(I ′) with I ′ ∈ P. Then I0 is a crucial
instance corresponding to I.
The correctness of this lemma follows from Lemma 1, Corollary 1 and Lemma 4. Lemma 1
says any dominated instance I ′ will not have a better solution than I. Corollary 1 says that
there is at least one dominated instance, the corresponding crucial instance will achieve the same
optimal solution to I. The greedy allocation sequence may not be optimal for any instance. But
it is optimal for a crucial instance by Lemma 4. Therefore, among all the greedy allocation
sequences, the best one is for a corresponding crucial instance.
Lemma 5 implies that we can solve Best Response by taking each dominated instance as
a candidate for a corresponding crucial instance and use GreedyAlg to solve it. We analyze the
running time of this algorithm. Let (z1, z2, . . . , zk1) and (z
′
1, z
′
2, . . . , z
′
k1
) be the position vectors
of the manipulator of two policies pi and pi′. We know that pi dominates pi′ if and only if zi ≤ z′i
holds for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k1}. The length of these policies is m. So for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k1}, the
value of z′i can be any integer between max{zi, z′i−1 + 1} and m. Combinatorial analyses with
some relaxations can easily establish an upper bound of O(mk1) for the number of dominated
policies. The algorithm to consider all dominated instances is not polynomial when the frequency
k1 of the manipulator in the policy is not a constant.
We will use a dynamic programming technique to reduce the number of dominated instances
to a polynomial without losing an optimal solution. To do so, we need the following properties.
4 Invariance Properties
Our idea is a divide-and-conquer method. We will partition the problem into two subproblems,
the first part is to allocate the first i items and the second part is to allocate the remaining
items. We need to find the properties in the first part that keep the invariance of the second
part. Once we find these properties, we may only need to find the best allocation sequence of the
first part for the manipulator satisfying these properties (for each fixed allocation sequence for
the second part). In this way, we may be able to use dynamic programming to reduce redundant
cases without losing an optimal solution.
It is easy to verify that the remaining problems are the same after executing two partial
allocation sequences satisfying the following two conditions:
1. The number of items allocated to each agent (including the manipulator) is the same;
2. The set of items allocated to all the agents is the same.
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However, it is still hard to find all partial allocation sequences satisfying the above two
conditions. In order to get a polynomial-time algorithm, we add the third condition below
3. The last item allocated to each non-manipulator is the same.
Definition 2 (Invariance Relation) Two (partial) allocation sequences are in the invariance
relation if they satisfy the above three conditions.
Recall that for an allocation sequence ξ, we use ξ(i) to denote the partial allocation sequence of
the first i allocations.
Lemma 6 Let ξ be a feasible allocation sequence and ξ(i) (1 ≤ i ≤ m) be a partial allocation
sequence. Let ξ′(i) be another partial allocation sequence that is in the invariance relation with
ξ(i). The allocation sequence ξ′ obtained by replacing ξ(i) with ξ′(i) in ξ is still a feasible
allocation sequence.
Since ξ(i) and ξ′(i) are in the invariance relation, we know that we will get the same remaining
problem after executing them. Thus we can exchange ξ(i) and ξ′(i) in larger allocation sequences.
The divide-and-conquer idea based on Lemma 6 will be embedded in our dynamic program-
ming algorithm. We will see that the algorithm will only split the problem between segments.
5 The Dynamic Programming Algorithm
Equipped with the above properties, we are ready to describe the dynamic programming algo-
rithm. The main idea of the algorithm is still based on Lemma 5. However, we will use Lemma 6
to reduce the number of subproblems.
Recall that m′ is the number of non-manipulator positions in the policy pi. For any integer
1 ≤ x ≤ m′, let k(x) denote the times of the manipulator appearing during the first x segments
of the policy pi, i.e., the period from the beginning of pi to the xth position of a non-manipulator.
For any dominated instance I ′, the occurrences of the manipulator in the first x segments of the
policy in I ′ is at most k(x). Recall that pis(x) is the partial policy of the first x segments of pi.
We use pro(x, y, i2, . . . , in) to denote the set of all feasible partial allocation sequences satis-
fying the following conditions:
1. The core of the partial policy associated with the partial allocation sequence is the same
as the core of pis(x);
2. The last allocation in the partial allocation sequence is to allocate an item to a non-
manipulator;
3. Exactly x items are allocated to non-manipulators and exactly y items are allocated to
the manipulator;
4. For each j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n}, the last item allocated to Agent j is the ijth item in its preference
ranking, where ij can be 0 which means no item is allocated to Agent j;
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5. For each r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , x}, during the first r segments at most k(r) items are allocated to
the manipulator;
6. The partial allocation sequence is a greedy one.
The domains of the parameters in pro(x, y, i2, . . . , in) are as follows: x ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m′},
y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k1} and i2, i3, . . . , in ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}. We may not describe the domains of the
parameters when they are clear from the context.
Note that even all of x, y and ij are fixed, the set pro(x, y, i2, . . . , in) may contain sev-
eral different allocation sequences, because the definition does not fix the positions of the y
manipulators in the corresponding (partial) policy. We have the following property.
Lemma 7 Any two partial allocation sequences in pro(x, y, i2, . . . , in) are in the invariance
relation.
Lemma 7 can be proved by checking each of the three conditions of the invariance relation
one by one, which is not hard and omitted here due to the limited space.
We use opt(x, y, i2, . . . , in) to denote a partial allocation sequence in pro(x, y, i2, . . . , in) where
the manipulator gets the best solution. Note that pro(x, y, i2, . . . , in) is possible to be empty
and for this case we let opt(x, y, i2, . . . , in) =⊥.
The allocation sequence opt(x, y, i2, . . . , in) even for x = m
′ may not be a complete allocation
sequence of length m, since y may be smaller than k1 and some allocations to the manipulator
are still left. In fact, opt(x = m′, y, i2, . . . , in) is a partial allocation sequence only missing
the last part of the allocations corresponding to the trivial segment of the policy. We use
opt∗(x = m′, y, i2, . . . , in) to denote the complete allocation sequence obtained from opt(x =
m′, y, i2, . . . , in) plus the k1−y allocations of the k1−y best remaining items to the manipulator.
The following two lemmas will say that the best allocation sequence among all opt∗(x, y, i2, . . . , in)
with x = m′ will lead to the optimal solution to the original instance.
Lemma 8 For any y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k1} and i2, i3, . . . , in ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}, if opt(x = m′, y, i2, . . . , in) 6=⊥,
then opt∗(x = m′, y, i2, . . . , in) is a greedy allocation sequence for an instance dominated by the
original instance.
Proof. By the definition, we know that opt(x = m′, y, i2, . . . , in) is a greedy partial allocation
sequence. Since opt∗(x = m′, y, i2, . . . , in) is obtained from opt(x = m′, y, i2, . . . , in) by adding
behind k1 − y best allocations to the manipulator, we know that opt∗(x = m′, y, i2, . . . , in)
is also greedy. We consider the policy pi∗ corresponding to the greedy allocation sequence
opt∗(x = m′, k1− z, i2, . . . , in). By the 5th item in the definition of pro(x, y, i2, . . . , in), we know
that for each r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , x}, during the first r segments at most k(r) items are allocated to
the manipulator. This means pi∗ is dominated by the original policy pi.
Lemma 9 Let Ic be a crucial instance corresponding to I, where the trivial segment in Ic consists
of z occurrences of the manipulator (0 ≤ z ≤ k1). Assume that in the optimal solution to Ic,
for each j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n}, the last item allocated to Agent j is the ajth item in its preference
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ranking. Then opt∗(m′, k1 − z, a2, . . . , an) leads to the optimal solution to the original instance
I.
Proof. The greedy allocation sequence S to Ic, also leading to an optimal solution to the original
instance I, is a candidate for opt∗(m′, y, a2, . . . , an). On the other hand, by Lemmas 8 and 1,
we know that opt∗(m′, k1 − z, a2, . . . , an) is not better than S. Since opt∗(m′, k1 − z, a2, . . . , an)
is chosen as the best one, we know that opt∗(m′, k1 − z, a2, . . . , an) is as good as S.
We can not directly compute an optimal solution to the original instance I according to
Lemma 9, since we do not know the values of aj in Lemma 9. However, by Lemma 5, Lemma 8
and Lemma 9, we know that the best one among all opt∗(x, y, i2, . . . , in) with x = m′ will get an
optimal solution to the original instance I. So our algorithm contains the following three main
steps.
1 Compute all opt(x, y, i2, . . . , in) by calling the subalgorithm OPT;
2 Compute all opt∗(x, y, i2, . . . , in) with x = m′ from opt(m′, y, i2, . . . , in);
3 Find the best one among all opt∗(x, y, i2, . . . , in) with x = m′.
The subalgorithm OPT in Step 1 is a dynamic programming algorithm that compute all
opt(x, y, i2, . . . , in) in an order with a nonincreasing value of x. Before presenting the whole
procedure of OPT, we introduce the idea in the algorithm.
Assume that all opt(x′, y, i2, . . . , in) for x′ < x have been computed. We use the following
idea to compute opt(x, y, i2, . . . , in).
We use r to denote the non-manipulator on xth position of the core of pi, i.e., the xth
non-manipulator in pi is Agent r. Assume that opt(x, y, i2, . . . , in) 6=⊥. Let pix be the policy
corresponding to opt(x, y, i2, . . . , in). We further assume that the last segment of pix consists of
q occurrences of the manipulator and one occurrence of Agent r. Then opt(x, y, i2, . . . , in) is
given by the allocations L1 of items to the first x− 1 segments of pix plus the allocations L2 of
items to the last segment of pix.
Since we require that the allocation sequence in opt(x, y, i2, . . . , in) is greedy, we know that
L2 is given by q allocations of the first q remaining items on Agent r’s preference ranking to
the manipulator plus one allocation of the (q + 1)th remaining item to Agent r. Furthermore,
the last item allocated to Agent r must be the irth item in Agent r’s preference ranking. By
Lemma 6, Lemma 7 and the fact that the utility function is additive, we know that L1 is given
by opt(x− 1, y − q, i2, . . . , i∗r , . . . , in) for some i′r ≤ ir − (q + 1).
However, we do not know the value of q and i∗r . In the algorithm, we try all possible values
for q and i∗r . Lemma 5 can guarantee that the best one among them is the correct allocation
sequence we are seeking for. The whole procedure of OPT is presented in Algorithm 1.
Next, we analyze the running time of the whole algorithm. The algorithm contains three
steps.
The first step is to compute opt(x, y, i2, . . . , in) for i2, i3, . . . , in ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}, x ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m′ =
m− k1} and y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k1}. In total, there are (1 +m)n−1(m− k1 + 1)(k1 + 1) < (1 +m)n+1
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Algorithm 1: Subalgorithm OPT
Input: An instance I = (O,N, pi, {i}ni=1) of Best Response.
Output: To compute opt(x, y, i2, . . . , in) for all x ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m′}, y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k1} and
i2, i3, . . . , in ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}.
1 for all values of x, y, i2, . . . , in, do
2 opt(x, y, i2, . . . , in)←⊥;
3 opt(0, 0, 0, . . . , 0)← ∅, which is empty but feasible;
4 for x = 1 to m′ do
5 Let Agent r be the non-manipulator on the xth position of the core of pi;
6 for all i2, i3, . . . , in ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} and 0 ≤ y ≤ k(x), do
7 for q ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k(x)} do
8 if There is a value i∗r ≤ ir − (q + 1) such that
opt(x− 1, y − q, i2, . . . , i∗r , . . . , in) 6=⊥, and after executing
opt(x− 1, y − q, i2, . . . , i∗r , . . . , in), the (q + 1)th remaining item on Agent r’s
preference ranking is exactly the irth item on the whole preference ranking of
Agent r, then
9 Let opt′ be opt(x− 1, y − q, i2, . . . , i∗r , . . . , in) plus q allocations of the first q
remaining items on Agent r’s preference ranking to the manipulator and
one allocation of the (q + 1)th remaining item to Agent r;
10 Let opt(x, y, i2, . . . , in) be the best of opt
′ and current opt(x, y, i2, . . . , in);
subproblems need to be solved. For each subproblem opt(x, y, i2, . . . , in) with x > 0, we compute
them from Steps 3 to 9 in OPT. In Step 6, we have k(x) + 1 loops. For each loop, we may use
at most O(itm) time. So for each subproblem opt(x, y, i2, . . . , in), our algorithm uses at most
O(m3) time. OPT runs in O((1 +m)n+4) time.
Step 2 takes at most O((1 +m)n+2) time to extend all opt(x = m′, y, i2, . . . , in) to opt∗(x =
m′, y, i2, . . . , in).
Step 3 is to find the best one among all opt∗(x = m′, y, i2, . . . , in), which can be done in
O((1 +m)n+1) time.
Theorem 10 Best Response can be solved in O((1 +m)n+4) time.
For each constant number n of agents, Best Response is polynomially solvable.
6 A 0.5-Approximation Algorithm
Although for each fixed number of agents, the manipulating sequential allocation problem can
be solved in polynomial time, the running time is exponential in the number n of agents. When
n is large, the algorithm will still be slow. So we also consider approximation algorithm for the
problem. We prove that
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Theorem 11 For any instance of Best Response with additive utility functions, if the ma-
nipulator takes the truthful preference ranking as its picking strategy, it can get a bundle with
the total utility being at least half of that of the optimal solution.
Proof.
Let I ′ be the corresponding crucial instance of the input instance I. By Corollary 1, we
know that an optimal solution to I ′ is an optimal solution to I. By Lemma 1, we also know that
a solution to I is at least as good as that to I ′ under the same picking strategy. So we only need
to prove the theorem holds for crucial instance I ′ and next we assume that the input instance
is crucial.
We use ξA and ξB to denote the allocations by taking the optimal picking strategy and by
taking the truthful preference as the picking strategy, respectively. Let A = {a1, a2, . . . , ak1} be
the bundle obtained by ξA and B = {b1, b2, . . . , bk1} be the bundle obtained by ξB, where we
assume that the items in the above two sets are listed according to the picking order.
We first prove that for any index 1 ≤ i ≤ k1 such that ai 1 bi, the item ai is also in B.
Assume to the contrary that ai 6∈ B, which means that item ai is not taken into the solution
in ξB. The allocation of item ai in ξA and the allocation of item bi in ξB happen as the same
position of the policy, say the xth position. In ξB, an item bi with u(bi) < u(ai) is allocated at
the xth position, which means that ai has already been allocated to some agent before the xth
position in ξB as the picking strategy in ξB is the truthful preference. However, the instance is
a crucial instance and the optimal allocation sequence in ξA is greedy. Item ai is impossible to
be allocated to a non-manipulator before the xth position in ξB. Then ai can only be allocated
to the manipulator in ξB, which is a contradiction to the assumption that ai 6∈ B. So the above
claim holds.
Let L = {i1, i2, . . . , il} be the set of indices ij such that aij 1 bij . Let L = {1, 2, . . . , k1}\L.
Note that L is not empty and index 1 is always in L. By the above claim, we have that∑
i∈L
u(ai) <
∑
b∈B
u(b).
By the definitions of L and L, we have that∑
i∈L
u(ai) ≤
∑
i∈L
u(bi) ≤
∑
b∈B
u(b).
By summing up the above two inequalities, we get that∑
a∈A
u(a) < 2
∑
b∈B
u(b).
We also give a simple example, where the approximation ratio cannot be 0.5 + ′ for any
constant ′ > 0. This will show the approximation ratio of 0.5 is tight for the mechanism of
using the truthful preference. There are three items O = {g1, g2, g3} to be allocated to two
agents N = {1, 2}. The preference rankings are 1: g1, g2, g3 and 2: g2, g3, g1. The policy is
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pi : 121. The utility function of the manipulator is that u(g1) = 1, u(g2) = 1−  and u(g3) = .
If the manipulator use the picking strategy g2g1g3, it can get items g2 and g1 with the utility
2 − . If the manipulator use the truthful preference ranking g1g2g3 as the picking strategy, it
can only get items g1 and g3 with the utility 1 + . The approximation ratio is
1+
2− = 0.5 +
1.5
2− ,
where 1.52− can be arbitrarily small.
7 Conclusion
Best Response can be regarded as one of the hardest natural problems in manipulating se-
quential allocation problems, since most other problems can be reduced to it. It has been known
for years that Best Response with only two agents can be solved in polynomial time. However,
it took more effort to establish the NP-hardness of Best Response with an unbounded number
of agents. In this paper, we complete the “gap” by showing that Best Response is polynomi-
ally solvable for any constant number of agents. Furthermore, we show that we can always get
a 0.5-approximation solution if taking the truthful preference ranking of the manipulator as its
picking strategy. Furthermore, the ratio 0.5 is tight as far as using the truthful preference rank-
ing. It may be interesting to consider the approximation ratio for using the truthful response
on more no-strategyproof problems.
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